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The objective of maintaining a high standard of welfare protection is shared by all
Member States of the European Union.
Controlling the cost of this protection presents a constant challenge: the protection must
continue to underpin social cohesion while' making a positive contribution to economic
growth.
Pension benefits are .a key component of Member States' welfare protection systems.
Expenditure by state pension schemes accounts for nearly half of all welfare spending
and is equivalent to between 9% and 15% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the
Member States. I This proportion is likely to rise steeply as a result of the ageing of the
EO population: in "1995, 23% of the population was 65 years of age or over; this figure
will rise to 40% in 2025.
Coping with these developments is mainly a matter for the Member States, which bear
responsibility for the organisation of their retirement systems. Generally speaking, these
systems are based on three pillars:
- the first pillar consists of social security schemes;
- the second occupational schemes;
the third personal pension plans.
Schemes coming under pillars 2 and 3 are supplementary schemes in that they are there
to supplement public schemes. 
It is with such supplernentary schemes that this communication is concerned. And of
particular concern here are pillar 2 occupational schernes, for which there is as yet no
proper Community legal framework. Due regard being had to the application il1 this area
of the subsidiarity principle, the Commissions role is one of proposing reforms that
might enable such schemes to benefit from the freedoms of the single market and the new
vistas opened up by the euro, thereby increasing their security and efficiency and
participating in the development of EU capital market.
This was one of the points made by the Commission communication of 28 October 1998,
Financial services: Building a framework for action 3 The framework, drawn up in
close cooperation with industry and Member States, contains proposals to complete the
integration of financial markets in the Union. More open retail financial markets will
provide more choice and flexibility for future pensioners. A more efficient capital market
will help pension funds by increasing the return on their investments, thus helping to
limit the indirect cost of labour and create jobs. The effect of this might be to strengthen
the economic foundation to our social welfare.
To this end, it is desirable that supplementary schemes should themselves be adapted in
order to take account of the single market and the euro. Investment rules should not
unnecessarily restrict the investment strategy of pension funds. For the management of
their assets, pension funds should be able to call upon the services of approved asset
European Economy, The Welfare State in Europe, Challenges and Reforms (No 4, 1997).
European Economy, Ageing and Pension Expenditure Prospects in the Western World (No 3, 1996).
Financial services: Building a framework for action (COM(1998) 625).managers, wherever these are located in the Union. Service providers of supplementary
pension products should be able to operate in all Member States.
At the same time, beneficiary protection must remain the cornerstone of the regulation
and control of retirement benefit institutions. All conceivable steps must be taken to
guarantee the payment of contractual benefits to future pensioners. However, these steps
must not go beyond what is objectively necessary to ensure that scheme members are
properly protected.
This view was shared by the vast majority of the Member States and representative
bodies that took part in the consultations on the Green Paper on supplementary pensions
in the single market launched by the Commission in June 1997. Although opinions still
differ on some points, e.g. investrnent rules, a broad consensus has been reached on the
need to begin introducing a Community framework which might revolve around three
main principles: the laying-down of prudential rules for pension funds; the removal of
obstacles to the free movement of workers; and coordination of Member States' tax
systems.
Prudential rules for pension funds
At present, although the value of assets held by pillar 2 pension funds5 established in the
Member States is equivalent to approximately 23% of the Union s annual GDP 6 there are
still no specific Community rules guaranteeing application of the principles of free
movement of capital and freedom. to provide services.
This is all the more regrettable since the euro has .created for investors a broader capital
market that is more liquid and devoid of exchange risk. In some Member States,
regulation is sufficiently flexible to allow pension funds to develop and adapt investment
policy to the new environment whilst maintaining pension security. Consequently, these
funds could better diversify their investment portfolio and achieve, to the benefit of both
employers and members, a better balance between risk and investment yield. If we are to
facilitate the financing of retirement pensions, it is clearly highly desirable to extend this
opportunity to all pension funds established in the European Union.
Experience has shown that over-restrictive investment rules have considerably harmed
the yields of pension funds without any gains in security. This has resulted either in
reduced benefits or in higher contributions to the detriment of labour costs. Moreover, by
especially targeting equity investment, these restrictions liInited the capacity to finance
the private-sector part of the economy; they also blocked the opening and integration of
capital markets in the Union. A more efficient capital market, with liquid and well
developed equity and private sector debt instruments, could contribute to strengthening
economic growth and job creation in the Union, and thus indirectly to facilitating the
financing of social welfare in the decades to come.
The adoption of a directive seems desirable in order to achieve this aim. The directive
should, in the opinion of the vast majority of the parties canvassed during the
consultations on the Green Paper and the drawing-up' of the  financial services action
framework, seek to attain the fonowing four objectives:
COM(97) 283. The responses to the Green Paper have been summarised ina working document
(CAB/62/98) available on DG XV's Internet site (hltp://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15).
Pension fund refers in this context to supplementary pensions linked to employment.
Source: European Federation for Retirement Provision (EfoKP). The figure is 20% if one subtrBcts the
assets of book reserve and group life assurance arrangements.(i) to ensure the best possible protection of beneficiaries. This means that investment
and rnanagement freedom has to be placed in an overall prudential framework.
(ii) to allow pension funds to profit fully from the single market and the euro. Pension
funds should only be limited in their investment strategy for prudential reasons. '
They should also be able to use the services of any asset manager and agent duly
approved in the Union.
(iii) to guarantee equal treatrnent between occupational pension providers. Pension
furtds have their own characteristics; they justify the development of a specific
legal framework. But at the same time, the introduction of competition distortions
with other service providers, such as life assurance companies,? must be avoided.
This involves the establishment of a genuine prudential framework, as undertaken
for life assurance companies. It could also involve the definition of similar rules
for well defined products.
(iv) to allow the mutual recognition of prudential regimes. At present, a pension fund
cannot have members in more than one Member State of the Union. Given the
characteristics of supplementary pension schemes and their link to public
schemes, only limited forms of membership sholdd be envisaged (for example,
inside a single company). Moreover, cross-border membership can only be a
long-term aim because numerous conditions need to be met: in particular, better
coordination between the tax systems in the Member States is required. Mutual
recognition of prudential regimes will also be needed. If a proposal for a directive
could allow for such mutual recognition, it would be a first step towards cross-
border membership. The latter would have several advantages: for migrant
workers, who would no longer run the risk of losing their supplementary pension
rights, but also for employers and pension funds, which would be able to achieve
economies of scale in terms Qf administrative and financial management, and
hence reduce labour costs.
From the present state of play it can be gathered that a proposal for a directive might
cornprise three sets of rules:
(i) Fundamental prudential rules. This involves in particular the approval of a
pension fund by a competent authority; the need to subordinate approval to strict
criteria covering responsibility, competence and the managers' standing; the
definition of the intervention powers of the supervisory authority; and the
setting-up of mechanisms for periodic declarations to members and the
supervisory authorities.
(ii) Rules concerning the investment of contributions. Absolute investment freedom
for pension funds is not desirable. Investments have to be adapted to the nature
and duration of the liabilities and duly diversified (by currency, geographical area
and econornicsector). The necessity of having a currency matching requirement
n~eds to be discussed. In any event, te regulatory framework has to be fully
compatible with the free movement of capital. It must be stressed that, in general
these aspects will have to form the subject-matter of detailed consultations with
.the Member States and industry.
Life assurance companies are also active in the supplementary pensions field, offering group life
contracts linked to employment. In some Member States, DCITS are likewise used as a vehicle to
provide this type of pension.(iii) Rules concerning the liabilities of pension funds and the link between assets and
liabilities Investments have to be based on a precise evaluatiol1 9f the fund'
liabilities. This evaluation establishes technical provisions calculated according to
a prudent and recognised actuarial method. Signature of the accounts of the
pension fund by an independent actuary has to be considered for this purpose. A
minimum financing level intended to guarantee that acquired rights to benefit are
completely covered also appears necessary.
Minimum harmonisation should be the aim for these subjects. Owing to the wide
disparity between pension funds ~tive in the Union, the objective can only be to fix a
general framework prescribing the principles to be respected in order to guarantee the
protection of recipients and economic effectiveness. Cooperation between supervisors of
pension funds seems, moreover, .essential. A body bril1ging together the competent
authorities may be useful once the directive is adopted.
The removal of obstacles to labour mobility in the Union
A fundamental principle of the single market, labour mobility is all the more important at
a time when economic and monetary union (EMU) is being established. At stake is the
credibility of EMU among the general public. Europe already has Community rules
coordinating effectively, for migrant workers, pillar 1 pension schemes. On the other
hand, the lack of such coordination in the case of supplementary pensions is a real barrier
to the free movement of workers covered by such schemes. This barrier will affect more
and more people and will limit workers' capacity for movement if Member States choose
to rely increasingly on supplementary schemes.
Debate here should therefore focus on the following aspects:
(i) conditions for acquiring supplementary pension rights. Conditions that are too
complex, or excessively long vesting periods, can constitute a considerable
obstacle to the free movement of persons. It is essential that Member Stares and
the social partners give this matter careful consideration.
(ii) the methods for transferring rights. It is a fact that the absence of a common
actuarial standard for the calculation of transfer values penalises migrant workers
compared with those who remain in the same Member State. On the basis of
technical work to be begun with all interested parties, the Commission could
envisage the possibility of a legislative proposal on the subject.
(iii) the conditions for cross-bOrder membership of pension funds. Cross-border
membership would require mutual recognition of supervisory regimes and better
coordination of tax systems. But occupational schemes are also, at the national
level, subject to specific social rules, which are connected in particular with
benefits payment (treatment of part-time and full-time employees, forms of
pension pay-outs, etc.). A technical study seems necessary in order to determine
how these rules have to be dealt with in the context of cross-border membership.
(iv) the creation of a pensions forum. A pensions forum .might prove to be a useful
place in which to discuss the implications of labour mobility in the Union. Such a
forum might facilitate the carrying-out of the necessary technical work in this
field. Bringing together representatives from the Member States, pension funds
This section is relevant mainly to defined benefit schemes.and the social partners, it might also monitor existing and future Community legislation. 
Coordination of Member States' tax systems
National disparities in the tax treatment of life assurance and pension products, their
complexity and specificities, are major obstacles to labour mobility and freedom to
provide services in the Union. While ruling out at this stage any harmonisation atternpt
and taking care to safeguard the tax income of Member States, it is felt that an endeavour
should be made to abolish national tax discriminatiol1 against products offered by
institutions (insurance companies, pension funds) established in other Member States.
Following this flexible and coordinated approach, the Commission and the
Member States have started to cooperate in order to examine how to eliminate the main
obstacles in this field. According to many migrant workers and employers, an issue
which needs to be addressed as a matter of priority is the treatment of contributions and
premiums paid to institutions that are established il1 a Member State other than that in
which the member or the policy-holder is established.
The subject is being dealt with within the framework of the Taxation Policy Group,
which serves as a high-level forum for discussion between the Commission and the
Member States in the tax field. There is a broad consensus on the need to continue the
work in hand. Given the diversity and complexity of the problems, a step-by-step
approach is generally seen as the appropriate way. On the basis of this work, a legislative
initiative which would cover the tax treatment of .cross-border contributions paid by
migrant workers to supplemel1tary pension funds might be envisaged.
Conclusion
These possible initiatives, which are summarised in Annex 1, would to some extent be
separate. They would nevertheless be highly interdependent. Cross-border mernbership,
for example, will require at one and the same time mutual recognition in prudential
matters, coordination of tax systems and an adaptation of social legislation.
All also make for a better integration of financial services in the Union. In. this, a dual
objective must be pursued: to contribute to the integration of financial services for the
benefit of growth and employment, and to improve the quality of the benefits provided to
future pensioners.INTRODUCTION
1.1 The need for a single market in supplementary pensions
Pension schemes areatthe heart of Member States' welfare protection. Population ageing
and its budgetary implications raise, in all MemberStates, the question of the financial
viability of such schemes. The State is as a rule the leading pension provider through
pillar 1 schemes, which are usually financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. There is a risk
therefore, that demographic trends will lead to a significant increase in public spending
on pensions. Member States, which are responsible for the structure of pension provision
have actively started reform but many types of continuing action will still be needed to
ensure the lasting financial stability of schemes (see box 2). The Commission has .stated
on a number of occasions that higher employment rates and productivity playa decisive
role in this regard. It has also stated that thought must be given to ways of tackling thc
numerous early retirement departures, which place a heavy burden on schemes." This
need to increase the employability of older people who have not yet reached the statutory
retirement age has, moreover, recently been confirrned by the Council in the 1999
Employment Guidelines 10. Part of the solution, in order to alleviate the burden on the
public purse, can also be greater reliance on funded supplernentary pensions related to
employment. It is therefore essential to put in place, frorn a financial and social point of
view, a Community framework that is conducive to their development.
See the communication "Modernising and improving social protection in the European Union
(COM(97) 102 final) and the draft communication "Towards a Europe for all ages , currently being
adopted, 10 Council Resolution of9 February 1999 on the 1999 Employment Guidelines (5530/99).Box 1: 
Tlte various types of pension scheme 
Pension schemes are traditionally described using the three pillars mode!: social security schemes
are part of pillar I .and supplementary schemes belong to pillars 2 and 3.
rill?!:' 1: this is the basic state scheme, in which participation is generally compulsory. These j
schemes are usually financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, where current workers' contributions are
used to fund the pension payments of retired people. Pension benefits are guaranteed by the State
and the scheme is managed by a public body. At Community level, Regulation 140817'
coordinates these schemes.
Pillar 2: these schemes are characterised by a link to employment, to a professional occupation.
They are known as "occupational schemes . They usually operate on a funded basis: employer
and employees build up savings which are invested and will be used to finance future pension
benefits. Moreover, they fr.equently provide cover for biometric risks (death, invalidity and
longevity). Occupational schemes can be organised in many different ways:
I .
I -
creation of -or participation in- a pension fund separate from the employer. The fund
receives the contributions, invests them and pays out the benefits. Funds are said to be
open" (companies from various industrial sectors can join in) or "closed" (participation
is limited toa single company or a group of companies from a given industrial sector).
There can be "defined benefits" schemes (the employer guarantees the payment of a
given level of benefits) or "defined contribution" schemes (benefits vary according to the
retul11s on the funds invested); , 
subscribing a group life .assurance contract: contributions are paid to a life assurance
company which invests them and pays the benefits. The insurance company generally I
underwrites ihe payment of the benefits. Life assurance companies are already regulated I 'It Commur.ity ievel; II 
ptirchasing of securities through an undertaking fer collective investment in transferable i
sB,::urities ~UCITS): contributions are used to buy securities. Pension benefits vary I
,"ccording to the returns provided by the securities. VCITS are already regulated at i
:cm,munity leve!;12 
b')ck r;:.ser\'e" mechanisms: the employer undertakes to pay benefits to his employee~ \
"ad makes provision for commitments on the liabilities side of his balance Sheet;
Pinali' 3: these are contracts subscribed by individuals with service providers, such as life I assurance companies or UCITS. 
The analysis carried out in this Communication cover the following areas.
Chapter 2 deals with the prudential regulation of pension funds that are separated from the
employer and the means to ensure a level playing-field between these funds and other providers
I of occupational pension schemes. 
! Chapter 3 examines the obstacles to the free movement of labour stemming from the social
! regulation govemingpension funds and book reserves schemes. 
II See Directives 79/267, 90/619 and 92196.
12 See Directives 85/611 85/612 and 88/220.Chapter 4 covers the taxation of supplementary pensions more generally: occupational schemes
and life assurance contracts. It considers the possibility of launching a first legislative initiative
on occupational schemes.
As a solution for ageing populations, funded supplementary schemes cannot, however
perform miracles. Whatever the system of financing (pay-as-you-go or funded), pensions
will always account for part of the domestic product for the period when they are paid.
Consequently, people in work always finance the benefits of cunent pensioners. But
supplementary schemes may offer a more global productive investment perspective. both
inside and outside the Community, unlike pay-as-you-go schemes, which offer only a
national perspective. For this reason, supplementary schemes, especially when there are
no cross-border portfolio restrictions, perrnit greater flexibility than pay-as-you-
schemes in coping with the demographic crisis affecting pension systems.
In other words, the advantages of pension savings must not be underestimated. If such
savings are invested productively, then they can help to increase national income and
hence ease the financing of pensions. The income from investrnents outside the Union
could in economies which are in need of capital, play an altogether decisive role here. '
Given the high savings rates in a number of Member States, pension fund growth might
only give rise to a switching between forms of saving. But it could also usefully prevent
in some countries, a fall in savings rates. What is more, pension savings have the
advantage of being a very long-term form of saving, contributing in a stable fashion to
the financing of the economy.
Box 
Demographic prospects, their financial implications
and possible responses
Resolving the retirement provision problem related to an ageing population is one of the major
challenges confronting all Member States of the European Union. The gravity of the situation
may vary from one Member State to another depending on their demographic structure. Bul
Member States in general are faced with some major political choices.
There are today four workers to every pensioner. In 2040 the ratio will be two to one. Without
reform, the level of expenditure of state pension schemes could in some Member States reach
15-20% of GDP (1997: approximately 10%). The scale of the possible fiscal implications must
be underscored: in some Member States, unfunded pension liabilities could rise to 200 % 
GDP.
Basic public schemes play an altogether central role in Member States' welfare protection
systems and should continue to provide a very significant part of retirement benefits. However, in
order to enable such schemes to perform this task without undermining public finances
Member States will have to adapt the financing of their schemes to take account of demographic
change. They have the possibility of developing supplementary schemes or of continuing to rely
essentially on public schemes and envisaging, for instance, an increase in the period of
contributions and/or a decrease in pension pay-outs. An increase in employment rates among, and
in the employability of, older people would also constitute an effective response to CUlTent trends.The June 1997 Commission Green Paper on supplementary pensions in the single
market 13 re-Iaunched the debate in an area in which the EU has failed so far to harness
the potential efficiency improvements offered by the single market. Without action, the
potential of the euro will also be missed. The lack of an adequate Community framework
in the field of supplementary pensions can be regarded as highly unsatisfactory for both
future pensioners and the pensions industry. 'The former are looking for a safe and high
pension when retired and the latter already have assets amounting to the equivalent of
23% of ED GDpI4 which they need to invest. Given the reforms launched in Member
States and which often aim at developing pension funds, this figure is constantly rising.
A reform has been introduced, for instance, in Italy and similar projects are being
discussed in France. It is essential that an appropriate Community framework
accompanies these trends.
The intention of the Green Paper was to foster the widest possible debate on the best
ways to tackle the demographic and economic challenges ahead and to determine how
the single market and the euro can increase the efficiency of supplementary pensions.
The specific role pension funds .are to play is for Member States to decide. However
decisions of Member States must take place in a coherent Community framework and
respect the following single market freedoms:
the freedom to provide services;
the freedom for labour to move across borders;
.. the freedom to invest across borders subject only to appropriate prudential
restrictions.
Furthermore, the Commission must take account of Article 2 of the EC Treaty, which
identifies the maintenance of a high level of employment and social protection as .
Community objective. This has to be done while respecting the subsidiarity principle,
according to which Member States are responsible for their pension scheme~.
1.2 The consultations on the Green paper on supplementary pensions in the
single market
The Commission received about 100 replies to the Green Paper from Member States, the
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee of the European
Communities, consumer organisations, unions, industry and all financial services. A
summary of the repliesl5 was prepared and used as a basis for discussion at a hearing
held on 21 April 1998 to which all interested parties were invited.
10. The Commission is very pleased with the high level of interest demonstrated by this
consultation phase and the overall firm level of support from nearly all parties for
, Community action in this area.
11. However, the Green Paper was criticised on two important horizontal points. Some
respondents felt that the Commission should have put more emphasis on the social
aspects of pension funds and that too much stress had been placed on pension funds as
vehicle to create European capital markets. It is clear that capital markets are there to
13 COM(97) 283 final. 14 Source: EFRP.
15 Document CAB/62/98, referred to above.serve pensioners, not the other way round. Therefore, the policy proposed by the
Commission will have as primary concern the protection of beneficiaries' rights and the
creation of an environment in which they can enjoy a high level of benefits. However, the
role that EU capital market integration can play in favour of growth and employment
should not be disregarded: efficient and transparent financial markets can facilitate access
to capital and enhance capital productivity.
12. The second issue raised by a number of respondents was the need to address more
specifically the security of pensions. Some of them insisted, for instance, on the need to
ensure that occupational pension plans are backed by an insurance mechanism
safeguarding the accrued rights of beneficiaries in the event of the insolvency of the
sponsoring cornpany and of a situation where the assets held by the fund are insufficient
to cover liabilities. It is obvious that future pensioners want maximum security for their
pensions. Pension security is a critical issue that the Commission should take more into
account in its future work, by proposing a genuine prudential framework for pension
funds.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the overwhelming majority of contributions fully
supported the Commission s analysis in the Green Paper. Other topics raised during the
consultations will be examined in the following chapters of this communication.
This communication will thus present the policy conclusions to be drawn from the
consultations and set out the steps the Commission considers necessary in order to move
towards a single market for supplementary pensions.
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PRUDENTIAL RULES FOR PENSION FUNDS COMPATIBLE WITH
THE SINGLE MARKET AND THE EURO
15. This chapter explains how the curo and the single market can help increase the
oecnrity and performance of pension funds. It outlines pro~osals for a directive on
the prudential regulation of pension funds that are separatejJfrom the .company and
operate on a funded basis.
Pension funds in the euro zone
Increased security of investment portfolios
16. The primary object of any prudential regulation is to protect consumers - or, in this case
members of pension schemes. The euro, by itself, with the elimination of currency risks
and currency matching requirements within the .euro zone, helps reinforce security.
Pension funds, as well as insurance companies, can benefit from a wider capital market
in which they can better diversify their assets and their risks. However, this cannot be
considered sufficient: in order to really guarantee beneficiaries' protection
diversification of assets has to build on an accurate estimate of the duration and cost of
the commitments. Pension funds have always to make sure that they hold enough liquid
assets, denominated in the same currency as the commitments, in order to pay the
benefits arriving at maturity. Furtherrnore, pension funds' activities have to be inserted in
a overall prudential framework. Pension funds must inter alia,  be duly authorised and
controlled by a competent authority. Members have to be informed, as well.as possible
about how the fund is managed.I ncrease4 effidem:y of investment portfolios
17. If Member States opt for increased reliance on schemes to supplement the basic state
social security scheme and if these schemes are funded, then an EU-wide capital market
and the euro can make the accumulation of these funds more efficient via increased
return on investment of pension fund assets. This can lead to higher pensions and thus
help to sustain basic state systems, or reduce the social charges for any given pension and
so have positive effects on the employment situation. But always, the balance between
different pension schemes remains a decision for individual Member States.
18. The euro contributes to increased efficiency in investment portfolio management.
Investors are able to make better use of deeper and more liquid capital markets due to the
elimination of exchange risks, a reduction of transaction costs and increased competition
between market participants. Most respondents to the Green Paper expect that an
ED-wide capital market will provide much more capacity than individual national
markets to absorb the likely growth in pension funds assets. ED equity and corporate
bond markets are still underdeveloped and therefore provide a huge potential for
expansion. This is especially true with regard to private bonds, which will offer a
broadened spectrum of interest rates at the same tirne as the spectrum of public bonds is
narrowing. Investment in private bonds could thus represent a significant 'source of
revenue for pension funds in the future.
19. Pension funds should also play an important role in the development of pan-European
risk capital markets because smaller and more innovative companies in the fields of key
technologies and industries such as telecornmunications, biotechnology, health care,
financial services and energy are constantly searching for equity or corporate bond
capital. They could usefully help financing the Trans European Networks projects, which
aim at improving mobility across the EU and which can receive venture capital . Given
the need to always have a well diversified investment portfolio, pension funds will only
invest a limited part of the contributions received in risk capital markets. However
, if all
European pension funds had 2% of their assets in risk capital shares, the impact on the
growth of small and medium-sized companies would undoubtedly be quite significant.
Box 
The benefits to the economy and employment of a single market for supplementary pensions
A single market for supplementary pensions would be beneficial not only to pensioners and
pension providers. More generally, the following benefits might ensue:
- enabling pension funds to invest on a continental .scale and increasingly in shares is likely to
improve their performance: this might help to reduce the indirect cost of labour, which is often a
brake on job creation;
- enabling pension funds to invest more in shares would increase the supply of capital to
European businesses. This would bring together investors and borrowers, thereby promoting the
process of banking disintermediation. Once free of bank charges, businesses would be able to
finance themselves more cheaply;
16 
Decision 1692/96 of23 July 1996.
17 Commission proposals on pension funds have thus to be seen in conjunction with the work undertakcll
in the field of risk capital. See "Risk capital: a key to job creation in the ED" (SEC(98) 552).pension funds have a key role to play in the growth of SIv1Es, especially those which are
, innovative in the new technologies. In the Union, between 1991 and 1995 employment increased
by 15% in businesses benefiting from risk-capital investment;
, - by enabling pension funds to manage plans in more than one Member State of the Union, such
funds would achieve economies of scale in terms of administrative and financial management. I
and this would have a knock-on effect on the indirect cost of labour. In a company or group of
companies, a fund covering the whole Union might well replace 15 separate occupational schemes. 
1.3  A qualitative approach to supervision
20. The euro is creatil1g a huge pool of European capital denominated in a single currency.
Market size and liquidity are thus increasing, allowing European companies to reduce
their cost of equity capital and to borrow money on better terms. At the same time, the
continued efforts of Member States within the Stability and Growth 'Pact to run smaller
budget deficits and reduce the level of government debt will have the effect of
crowding- " private-sector capital.
Hence, double dividends are within reach: for future pensioners and the economy of the
Union as a whole. However, there are obstacles to bringing about this "golden scenario
capable as it is of providing a major stimulus to investment with positive consequences
for job creation and growth.
Some of these obstacles are related to investment rules. Quantitative and rigid assct
allocation rules applied in some Member States will hamper pension funds in their
attempt to operate on an ED-wide capital market. Stringent limits on the proportion of
equities that pension funds can have in their investment portfolio could notably reduce
their rate of return (see box 4), without improving the security of the investments. In fact
excessively strict quantitative restrictions can even be a threat to security. Such
restrictions might prevent investors from benefiting from the euro zone in order to
diversify theirs risks. Moreover, experience shows the lower volatility, and hence the
lower risk, of equity investment in comparison with government bond investment over
the period of time of a retirement commitment (see Annex 4). Only it qualitative
approach to supervision wil1 provide pension funds with the necessary flexibility to
achieve the appropriate mix between risk and return in view of the demographic sea-
change and the opportunities provided by ED-wide capital markets. At the same time
and as mentioned before, every step needs to be taken to protect as weB as possible the
rights of members. Therefore, freedom of investment must always be subject to a proper
diversification of assets and inserted into a global prudential framework.
This flexible approach wil1 also enable pension funds to participate in the development of
risk-capital companies.. It is recognised that in the United States, at the end of the 19705
the elimination of investment restrictions imposed on pension funds played a key role in
the development of technologically innovative SMEs. Furthermore, these SMEs have
provided high levels of returns (see Annex 5). Continued financing of pension provisions
relying essentially on public debt, on the contrary, could have the effect of depriving
industry, and especially smalJ and medium-sized companies, of the private investrnent
they need in order to playa positive role in the push for growth and employment.
21.
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23.Box 
How to improv..e both the security and performance of pension funds
In those countries in which pension funds are widespread and where they operate successfully,
there are no quantitative restrictions on the mix of investments (e.g. listed and unlisted equities
bonds, real estate, loans, etc.). Annex 2 illustrates the better returns of pension funds which are
not constrained by investment restrictions. These better retUrns have been achieved because the
share of equities in the asset portfolio can be much higher than in countries which prescribe
quantitative limits on the asset mix. They therefore take advantage of the better returns generally
provided over the last few decades by equities in comparison with govemment bonds (see Annex
4).
Some Member States impose strict quantitative limits on certain classes of asset - especially
equities - that pension funds can hold. Apart from the fact that this generally  de facto  reduces the
rate of retum of a portfolio, it is considered more prudent to invest a substantial part or'the asset
portfolio in equities because they can better meet the long term nature of pension liabilities. It is
important to note in this regard that over the long term, as shown in Annex 4, equities are less
volatile than government bonds. This is notably due to the constant growth, in the long run, of the
real economy and productivity, reflected in the stock-market quoting of companies. Public bonds,
while being more stable in the short term, are subject to inflation and interest-rate variations.
Furthermore, equity Investment can be regarded as an effective tool to tackle the inflation risks
inherent in future pension payments.
Reducing quantitative constraints within an appropriate prudential framework would therefore
give asset managers enough flexibility to increase equity investrnent as they see fit, thereby
increasing pension fund performance while providing security.
Prudential rules for pension funds
Appropriateness o/a directive
24. The consultations on the Green Paper on supplernentary pensions showed that several
Member States, several social partners and almost the entire fil1ancial sector consider that
the lack of a framework for pension funds constitutes a major gap in the European
legislation on financial services. 18 This is the view taken by the Economic and Social
Committee, which, in its opinion of 10 December 1997,
19 indicated that a directive on
fundamental principles would be appropriate. This is also the opinion of the European
Parliament, which, in its resolution of 3 December 1998 on the Green Paper, asked the
Commission to adopt a proposal for a directive which, in particular, could "enable
pension funds to enjoy freedom of investment, lay down the spheres and limits of
operation in the individual Member States, and the operating procedures for pension
funds to raise capital on Community markets.. ." and allows ... advisers to exercise the
freedom to provide management services, if they are licensed to do so in anyone
Member State...
18 It is worth recalling that the assets held by pension funds in the 15 Member States total around 23% of
the Union s GDP. By way of comparison, assets of insurance companies amount to approximately 35%
of GDP, operating in a single market based on nearly 30 legislative or regulatory acts.
19 ESC 1403/97. 20 Point 3 of Resolution A4-0400/98.The curo contributes in itself to widening the investment opportunities available to
pension funds. Possible restrictions contrary to the Treaty could for their part be
eliminated by means of infringement proceedings. It follows, nevertheless, from the
consultations that the combination of these two options would not have, for the socia!
and financial operators concerned, the same advantages as a clear legal framewo;t
harmonising fundamental prudential principles.
A directive, moreover, seerns necessary in order to allow the mutual recognition of
prudential supervisory regimes, which is necessary for cross-border membership of
pension funds. Numerous cornmentators stressed the need to lay down highly specific
membership conditions, especially inside the same company or group of companies, and
this despite the fact that there can be no question of opening up completely the
supplementary pensions market, as supplementary schemes are closely linked to basic
public schemes. But cross-border membership would facilitate the mobility of workers in
the Union: the consultations showed without ambiguity that the, impossibility of any
cross-border membership constituted a major obstacle to such mobility. And it would
enable pension funds to achieve econornies of scale in terms of adrninistrative and
financial management.
The lack of mJ..ltual recognition of supervisory regimes is obviously not the only obstacle
to cross-border rnembership. Other obstacles include, in particular, tax obstacles 'which
are best treated within the framework of the Taxation Policy Group?' Obstacles that are
inherent in the specific legal or regulatory provisions in force in some Member States
(for example, the obligation to contribute to a national occupational scherne) should also
be treated in cooperation with the Member States concerned. The proposal for a directive
suggested here would therefore constitute only a first stage in the lifting of the various
obstacles which, at this stage, prevent cross-border membership?2
26,
27.
Scope  and  content
28. In order to enSure a homogeneous scope, any directive could concern only those
institutions which are genuine entities, are not part of the social security system and
operate on a funded basis.23 The choice of a directive covering pension fund institutions,
and not all occupational pension products, would be consistent with existing European
legislation on financial services. Products offered by life assurance companies .and
UCrTS would not be affected as they are already covered by Cornmunity legislation.
In order to ensure that the above-mentioned objectives are met and to afford future
pensioners the best possible protection, a future proposal for a directive could cover the
following:
29.
, See section 4 below. 22 It is desirable that any political action in this area should, were it to be decided on, be based on
statistics reflecting economic reality in the sector. Eurostat has accordingly initiated the establishment
of a common framework for the collection, compilation, transmission and evaluation of data on the
structure, activities and performance of pension funds in the countries of the Union. This framework,
which is annexed to Council Regulation  58/97,  might be adopted in 2000.
23 The need for an homogenous scope of a possible Directive seem to require that pay as you go and
book reserves schemes remain outside of this exercise, However, entities managing these schemes
should comply with the EC treaty provisions 011 free movement of capital and free provision of
services. Furthermore, a list of social security institutions to be excluded from the scope of the
proposal will doubtless have to be drawn up.Basic prudential requirements
separation of the assets of the pension fund and of the sponsoring company;
authorisation of pension funds by a comp~tent authority and setting-up of a
system of sanctions;
need to make authorisation subject to strict criteria regarding the
responsibility, competence and integrity of managers;
definition of the supervisory authoritys powers to intervene;
setting-up of a rnechanism for periodic statements to members. Transparency
is absolutely crucial for the protection of beneficiaries. They must always
have the opportunity to be aware of the financial situation of the fund. This is
especially true concerning defined contribution schemes in which the worker
generally bears the investment risk.
setting-up of a mechanism for periodic statements to the supervisory
authorities. These might be supplemented at regular intervals by an
explanation of the overall investment strategy in the light of the commitments
entered into.
InveStment rules
30. The principle of "prudent person" management (see box 5) drew wide support during the
consultations. It would be the most appropriate regulatory framework with a view to free
movement of capital and would allow managers to achieve optimum matching of assets
to the nature and duration of their commitments, while taking account of changes in the
econornic and financial context. It is f\~SO suited to the usual profile of pension
commitrnents: the liabilities extend over several decades. It is therefore vital that fund
managers be in a position.. to use a variety of assets with greater or lesser liquidity. Any
quantitative restriction of assets by category should be duly justified on exclusively
prudential grounds. If Member States so wish, national authorities might be allowed to
apply quantitative limits provided they do not unduly restrict freedorn of investment (e.
a 70% ceiling on stock investment). Legal requirements to the effect that funds must
invest in specific categories of asset, and a proliferation of quantitative thresholds which
in fact significantly restrict freedom of investment must, however, be avoided.
Investments in a single issuer and in the sponsoring company should be limited to a
prudent level (e.g. 5-10%).Box 
Prudent person investment principle and modern asset-liability
management techniques (ALM)  application in practice
The prudent person investment principle
Prudent person rules are general guidelines for those responsible for the conduct of pension funds
and investment activities (e.g. fidudary agents, trustees, asset managers). These rules are of a
qualitative nature. The aim is that the responsible persons behave as careful professionals in
making investment decisions, but at the same time are aware of the need to earn an adequate
return on investments. Prudent person principles require that the fund does not assume
unnecessary risk. In fact, it aims at diminishing risk through diversification.
The prudent person investment principle is not just an abstract principle but works in practice.
Several Member States have successfully applied it over long periods. It has been shown to give
security equivalent to other types .of investment rules, but higher yields. If investment strategy is
overly timid, this can have the effect of unnecessarily reducing returns. But reckless use of
freedom. of investment clearly violates the prudent person principle. Both situations lead to sub-
optimal results and must be avoided.
Modern asset-liability management (ALM) techniques
Modern ALM is very helpful as a means of managing investment portfolios and ensuring that
assets are invested in a way that reflects the nature and duration of the corresponding liabilities.
The prudent person investment principle can be regarded as a substantial component of modern
ALM techniques and of the financial risk management of financial institutions. These techniques
provide information on risks of financial market volatility and their impact on both assets and
liabilities.
A properly functioning ALM is most effective when there are no quantitative restrictions for fund
managers .and trustees in order to fulfil the needs of portfolio diversification as part of risk
diversification. Risk diversification aims at improving the return-to-risk ratio of the investment
portfolio. During the consultations on the Green Paper, professional respondents gave strong
support to the idea that the diversification of investments permitted by an ALM approach would
increase the protection of investors by minimising their exposure to problems arising in
individual countries or types of investment, rather than increase risks.
For the time being, mathematical ALM techniques are used mainly in big institutions because of
their cost. Small and medium-sized institutions use more conventional methods of liquidity
planning. However, service provision in the field of risk measurement and risk management is a
growing market.
Mature pension funds must always ensure sufficient liquidity. These mature pension funds will
have liabilities with a short time horizon and high degree of risk aversion. In contrast, immature
pension funds with long-term liabilities and whose cash inflow from contributions is higher than
the cash outflow in the form of pension payments will reflect this situation in their investment
strategy. Therefore, the share of cash and liquid assets in a portfolio covering short-term
liabilities has to be higher than in immature pension schemes. Any given strict quantitative
ceiling can thus prove to be appropriate for some pension schemes but not for aU of them. Only a 
qualitative approach to prudential supervision can cater for the various structures of pension scheme liabilities. Box 
Adequate supervision
The experience of those Member States which apply the prudent person investment principle and
modern asset~liability management techniques shows that a strict supervisory framework is
necessary. The sole application of the prudent person principle is not sufficient. It must be
inserted in an overall prudential framework, with both internal and external controls via:
scheme actuary and fundmanager/trUstee - internal controls;
external auditor;
competent supervisory authority.
Scheme actuary and fund manager/trustee  internal controls
The scheme actuary has to make sure that the pension commitments are calculated in .a prudent
way. He must ensure that the assets reflect the nature and duration of liabilities. The structure
established by the actuary is the primary guarantee of pension security. Therefore the scheme
actuary sets the framework for the scheme trustee who must ensure that this policy is efficiently
carried out.
Internal control procedures usually comprise
structural measures (e.g. strict separation of front-office and back-office functions with
regular auditing checks);
measurement and management of investment risks and of the information system.
External auditor
The external auditor has to check whether the internal control system implemented in a pension
fund works effectively to guarantee a high level of security for the beneficiaries. He must
therefore verify whether the internal control procedures established by the management are
rigorous enough and whether the investment managers actually follow the prescribed procedures.
Competent supervisory authority
Pension funds usually report on the structure of their liabilities, and their investment policy plan
is part of the annual accounts which may be examined by the competent supervisory authority.
This provides the supervisor with the possibility of checking whether the applied risk
diversification procedures and internal control structures are adequate. If he considers it
necessary, the supervisor can impose remedial measures and sanctions. Given the key role asset
management, trustees and actuaries play in the application of the prudent person principle, they
are normally subject to, special "fit and proper" criteria.
Most responses to the Green Paper considered that increased use of the prudent person
investment principle and modern ALM techniques implies an important change and a challenge
for those supervisory bodies that are applying strict quantitative limits at the moment. A shift
from a quantitative approach to a qualitative supervisory approach may take time. But the
benefits of such a change greatly outweigh the costs.Currency matching requirement
31. The negotiations leading up to the 1991 proposal for a directive failed essentially because
of differences of opinion over currency matching. However, the euro considerably limits
the scale of these difficulties by rnaking any currency matching requirement within the
euro zone unnecessary. With regard to countties not initially participating in EMU,
solutions similar to those adopted in the insurance field could be considered, i.
non-participating Member States could be permitted to consider that assets in euros
match commitments in national currency?4 It remains to be seen whether a matching
requirement should be applied to assets in third-country currencies. European legislation
imposes an 80% matching rule on insurance companies. The very long-term nature of
commitments contracted by pension funds allows them, however, to worry less about
exchange rate fluctuations. The view might also be taken that income from investments
placed outside the European Union in countries which require capital and in which the
proportion of the active population is greater than in the ED might usefully help in the
coming decades to finance retirement benefits in EU countries. This question should be
the object of further discussions between the Commissiol1 and the Member States.
III Freedom of choice for managers
32. The right of managers of pension funds to make use of any approved provider of
management services (agent, asset manager) anywhere in the EU should be confirmed in
any proposal for a directive.
Link between assets and liabilities
33. Protection of beneficiaries demands that freedom of investment be based on an accurate
assessment of the commitments entered into by the fund (see box 7). This includes
calculating technical reserves according to a prudent and recognised actuarial method.
An appropriate calculation of technical reserves is the first guarantee of security for
members, and the signing of the fund's accounts by an independent actuary might be
considered in order to improve this security. A second guarantee might be to impose a
minimum level of finance of pension funds in order to ensure that acquired pension rights
are fully covered. Finally, a third guarantee isa prudent evaluation of the assets covering
the technical reserves. The holding of assets in excess of technical reserves might also
protect members against the risk of a sudden loss of value. However, any requirement in
this respect should be moderate (e.g. around 5%) so as to limit the loss of tax revenues.
24 See point 5 of Annex 1 to Directive 92/96/EEC (thit-d life assurance Dit-ective). The following
asymmetry should be noted: insurance companies established in Member States belonging to the euro
zone do not have the possibility of matching their commitments denominated in euros with assets
denominated in currencies of non-participating Member States.
25 These comments apply above all to defined benefit schemes. In defined contribution schemes, the
benefit to which the member is entitled is based on the total of contributions paid and income from the
investments made with the funds so contributed; he therefore bears the entire investment risk.Box 
Nature of the pension liability
The first line of security for future pensions is the calculation of future liabilities in a sufficiently
prudent way. A sufficient provision for liabilities serves as a starting point when applying ALM
and this' procedure can be regarded as a core matter of security. Assets must then  be chosen
appropriately to match these liabilities; With respect to the variety of existing pension products
offered in the market, general distinctions can be drawn between firm commitment pension plans
(usually defined benefit schemes) and best effort commitment pension plans (usually defined
contribution schemes).
In defined benefit schemes, the benefit to which the employee is entitled is determined by a
formula which typically links the annual pension to the employee s years of service and earnings
history. Such schemes ca., be unfunded (no separate fund), underfunded (fund is worth  less than
the present value of promised benefits), overfunded (fund is worth  more than the present value of
promised benefits) or simply funded (fund is worth the present value of promised benefits). The
employer usually bears the investment risk and guarantees to make up any shortfall.
In defined contribution schemes the benefit to which the employee is entitled is based on thc
accumulated contributions made on the employee s behalf, together with the investment income
earned on these contributions. A key feature of a defined contribution plan is that the beneficiary
bears all the investment risk and by definition the retirement account is always fully funded.
prudential framework for supplementary pensions must take into account the different
implications of defined benefit and defined contribution schemes. The guarantees given to the
employee and the question of who bears the investment risk are two key issues in this regard. The
existence of so-called hybrid pension plans, which combine features of both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans, has also to be taken into account.
2.3  Insurance against system failures (see box 
34. One additional safety measure might be to insure against the risks of the scheme being
. interrupted. In a defined benefit scheme, this type of insurance, which can take various
forms (guarantee given by a third party, guarantee fund, state guarantee, etc.) is meant to
remedy a situation in which the fund's sponsoring company becomes insolvent and the
assets held by the fund are not sufficient to meet the commitments entered into. It rnight
also be useful in the case of both defined benefit and defined contribution schemes as a
means of remedying any fraudulent activities on the part of managers. However, a system
of this kind needs to avoid the pitfall of the moral hazard. Knowing that acquired rights
will in any case be honoured, some managers might be drawn into a risky investment
strategy. It may be possible to avoid this altogether by lirniting cover to cases of illegal
transactions (e.g. fraud, embezzlement or theft).
Member States should consider whether this rnight be appropriate, L-, partic~lar when it
comes to responding to the problems which result from fraudulent transactions. It is
essential that potential members-, notably when cross-border membership becomes
possible, be duly informed of the existence or otherwise of such insurance.
35.Box 
National experiences with regard to plan termination systems
Germany: in 1996, about 57% of occupational pensions in Germany were established as
book reserves. Under the book reserve method, firms must form a book reserve to offset the
pension benefits earned by employees as these benefits accrue. There is no legal separation of
assets that cover the pension liabilities from other assets of the company. To protect the
promised pension benefits in the event of employer insolvency, the book reserve system is
accompanied by mandatory insolvency insurance. Insolvency insurance is provided by the
Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein auf Gegenseitigkeit (pSVaG), a mutual, insurance corporation.
Apart from investment returns on .PSVaG assets, employers are required by law to make
contributions sufficient to fmance the insolvency insurance on a pay-as-you-go basis.
United Kingdom: the minimum funding requirement (MFR) sets out a statutory funding
level most private-sector defined benefit occupational pension schemes must meet. The MFR
is a discontinuance test aimed at ensuring that the scheme has sufficient funds to meet
members' benefits at any time, thus providing protection if the employer becomes insolvent.
Apart from the MFR, all UK pension schemes are generally part of the Pensions
Compensation Scheme, which provides compensation to members in certain limited
circumstances where the assets of the scheme are insufficient to pay benefits (there should be
at the same time insolvency of the employer, underfunding of liabilities by more than 10%
and reduction of assets caused by theft or fraud). The compensation is financed by a levy
payable by all schemes.
United States: the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (pBGC) guarantees pensions
provided by defined benefit schemes. In general, US defined benefit schemes are required to
purchase PBGC insurance, whereas PBGC is required to provide coverage to protect
participants in these plans. PBGC is financed by premiums from insured pension plans,
investment returns on PBGC assets, assets held by plans at termination and amounts
recovered from employers who terminate underfunded plans.Means of ensuring equal treatment of operators
General comments
36. The consultations showed support for the idea that similar pension products should be
subject to equivalent prudential treatment, irrespective of the institutions offering them
(life insurers, pension funds, combined banks and insurance cornpanies, UCITS). The
main service providers currently operating under pillar 2 are pension fUl1ds, both .open
and closed (see box 9), and life assurance companies. Annex 3 indicates some of the
differences between these institutions and the products they offer.
In general, the Commission considers that a specific prudential framework should be
defined for pension funds. Applying rules identical to those applicable to life assurance
would not seem appropriate given the existence of several institutional and functional
differences between the two. It is, however, absolutely essential that everything should be
done to offer pension fund members the highest possible standards of security. This
means that account should be taken of the diversity of existing pension funds and that
precise and strict rules should be laid down which take account of both the assets and
liabilities on pension funds' balance sheets , as has already been done for insurance
companies.
37.
Equality of treatment at the level of the institution
38. At the level of the institution, the insolvency of a life assurance company and the
interruption of a pension fund scheme have very different consequences for beneficiaries.
Where the operation of a pension fund is interrupted, members are generally deerned to
own the assets held by it. By contrast, when a life assurance company becomes insolvent,
policy-holders will often form a group of creditors which has a lower claim than other
creditors (the liquidator, the cornpany s employees, the tax authorities, social security
institutions). The need to protect beneficiaries might therefore justify stricter prudential
rules.
39. Still at the level of the institution, it should be remembered that most pension funds
operating in the Union are closed funds which offer their services on a non-profit-making
basis to a single firm or a single group of firms within the same branch of the economy.
Such institutions predominate in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the, two
MemberStates in which pension funds are most common. These institutions do not seek
to offer their products to other employers and this distinguishes them from insurance
companies. A competition problem can arise, however, prior to the setting-up of an
occupational pension arrangement. At this moment, the employer and/or social partners
have the choice between the services ora -life assurance company, the creation of a
closed fund, participation in an open fund or other arrangements.
26 See Box 6 and Annex 2.Equality of treatment at the level of the product
40. At the level of the product, it must be stressed that, in the bulk of cases, pension funds do
not themselves guarantee payment of the pension. In the case of defined benefit schemes,
payment is usually guaranteed by the employer, while in defined contribution schemes
the member usually bears the investment risk. Life assurance companies, on the other
hand, usually commit themselves to a guaranteed fixed rate of interest. Life assurance
companies offering products where the investment risk is borne by the investor are an
exception. In such cases, there is a lower solvel1cy margin requirement (1% 
mathernatical provisions instead of 4% when the insurance company bears the il).vestment
risk)?? This fact also seems to rnilitate in favour of different prudential treatment.
41. Competition might, however, be distorted if, in the Same way as an insurance cornpany, a
pension fund itself guaranteed to pay benefits. In this case, application of a solvency
margin of 4% of the rnathematical reserves should be contemplated. This is, incidentally,
how things are regulated for pension funds in several ED Member States, includin,g
Germany and Spain.
Equality of  treatment and investment rules
42. Inequality of treatment might also occur at the level of investment rules. This would be
the case, for example, if the investment rules proposed in a future directive were more
flexible than the national provisions adopted by some Member States in transposing the
investment rules of the third life assurance Directive. This problem might be dealt with in
two ways: either unilaterally by the Member States concerned, which, while remaining
within the framework established by the third Directive, might make their investment
rules more flexible, or multilaterally, by considering the possibility of drawing up ad hoc
investment rules for covering the technical reserves linked to group policies taken out
with life assurance companies.
27 See Article 19(e) of the first life assurance Directive (791267/EEC).Box 
Issues to be considered in (Jrder to ensure a level playing-field
between occupational pension providers
The problem of the level playing field can only be solved through a comprehensive analysis of
pension business managed by the various types of pension providers. The following elements
have to be considered.
The  type  of benefits offered: a distinction must be made between fmn commitment pension
business (usually defined benefit plans) and best effort commitment pension business
(usually defined contribution plans). The plan/scheme can be financed through a diversity of
vehicles, e.g. pension funds, insurance programmes, etc.
The  type  of guarantees offered: a distinction must be made between company-sponsored
pension funds (where the employer usually bears responsibility for the final delivery of
pension benefits) and open or autonomous pension funds (institutions that themselves bear
responsibility for the payment of the benefit or where all the risks arebome by the
employee);
The types of risk: a distinction must be II1flde between technical risks (risks relating to '
pension liabilities, notably actuarial calculations and underlying projections) and fmancial
risks (risks relating to assets covering pension liabilities, notably investments, interest rates
and inflation);
The type of pension asset administration: a distinction must .be made between self-
administration (where the institution manages the pension business assets and pension
business liabilities itself), simple financial management28 and financial management with
guarantee;
The rights of pensioners in case of insolvency: a distinction needs to be made between
pension funds where future pensioners are the sole creditors and life assuranCe companies
where future pensioners are only one in a list of creditors whose preference is ranked
according to national law.
28 Business line run by life assurance companies pursuant to Article 1(2)(c) of Directive 79/267/EEC. 29 Business line run by life assurance companies pursuant to Article 1(2)(d) of Directive 79/267/EEc.A ne'wcontext
43. The withdrawal of the proposal for a directtve presented by the Commission in 1991 and
amended in 199330 and the problems linked to the 1994 communication
3! have
highlighted the difficulty of reaching agreement between the Member States on how the
prudential supervision of pension funds should be brought into line with the principles of
the single market. However, in the light of the reactions to the Green Paper and the
consultations which have taken place in the context of the framework for action on
financial services, the Commission considers it should take this matter up again.
44. While remaining true to the central objectives of freedom of investrnent and
managernent, this new initiative should differ from earlier proposals on a number of
points. Drawing the lessons from the consultations, the new proposal should place greater
emphasis on fund security and compliance with basic prudential requirements. It would
thus not focus solely on asset allocation, but would take better account of constraints
linked to the liabilities on a pension fund's balal1ce sheet and the need to avoid creating
any distortion of competition between the rnain operators in the area of supplernentary
pillar 2 pensions. Finally, the proposal should be more ambitious and strive to take a first
step towards creating the conditiol1s necessary for cross-border membership. The
probable emergence in the long term of transnational products calls for the development
in the Union of cooperation between national pension fund supervisors. The specifics of
such cooperation should be considered in the near future,
45. A proposal for a directive would be put forward in a very different context to that
prevailing in 1991. Apart from the single currency, which offers pension funds greater
security and wider investment possibilities, there is nowadays much greater consensus on
the need to reform pension schemes in order to face up to the budgetary and demographic
prospects summarised in the first chapter of the Green Paper. These prospects require all
public authorities to do their utmost within their respective areas of competence to ensure
the long-term financial sustainability of pension schemes. Enabling supplernentary
schemes to take advantage of the single market and the euro should be seen in this
context.
30 91/C 3'12/04.
31 94/C 360/08.FACILITATING THE FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
46. This chapter examines the problems generated by occupational pension schemes for
the free movement of workers in the Union.
47. A fundamental principle of the single Market, labour mobility is, potentially, all 
tpe  more
important now that Economic and Monetary Union has been established. Europe
already has effective community rules which co-ordinate first-tier pensions for migrant
workers. These have allowed millions of EU workers to migrate within the Union for all
or part of their working Jives, secure in the knowledge that they can receive a retirement
pension based on the aggregation of their years of work throughout the, Union. 
contrast, the absence of ' such a co-ordinating system for supplementary pensions
constitutes a real barrier to free movement on the part of those European citizens who are
covered by such systerns. This barrier will, if Member States choose to rely increasingly
on supplernentarypensions, affect more and more people and will, in the process,
damage the capacity for mobility within the European labour force.
48. Successive European Councils have stressed the paramount importance of creating
conditions in the Member States that would promote a skilled and adaptable workforce
and flexible labour markets responsive to economic change. The remaining problems
relating to supplementary pensions constitute real obstacles to free movement and
adaptability. In order to meet the objectives of the European Employment strategy, these
challenges require active intervention by the member States and the European Uniol1.
General considerations
49. Article 420f the EC Treaty specifies that the Council shall, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Cornmission, adopt such measures in the field of social security as .are
necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers.
50. On this basis, the Community adopted legislation (Regulations (EEe) No 1408/71 and
No 574/72)32 which aims to remove obstacles to cross-border mobility of workers in the
field of statutory pensions. The legislation does not interfere with the freedom of
Member States to determine the organisation of their own statutory pension schemes; it
seeks to ensure that the potential mobility of a worker is not impeded by being penalised
in terms of pension (and other social protection entitlements) on moving from one
Member State to another.
51. These Community Regulations, however, do not apply to supplementary pension
schemes.
52. In this connection as far back as its Communication to the Council of July 1991, the
Commission addressed these questions and mapped out the future action to be taken in this
area. While stressing the positive role played by_supplementary pension schemes in
providing workers with social protection, it highlighted a number of obstacles to the free
movement of workers and thus to the completion of the Single Market.
The updated version of these Regulations is published in OJ L 28 of 30.1.1997. Since the extension of
the personal scope of the Regulations to self-employed persons, the additional legal basis of Article
308 of the Treaty has been required.~;:
Ie 
:, 
requires the elimination af any national measur,:: likely to impedl;; or render Jess
altr;."c1vc the exercise by workers of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by ~he Treaty itS
interpreted in successive judgements by the Court of Justice . Action is, therefore, needed
to remove such obstacles in order to faciiitatecross-border mobility of workers while ta!~ing
account of the specific features of supplementary pension schemes.
54. In the Green Paper on Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market, the Commission
posed a number of questions to all interested parties (including governments, social
partners, and supplementary pension scheme representatives) which are intended to
deepen the analysis of the remaining problems which constitute obstacles to free
movement. They concerned in particular long vesting periods, difficulties with
transferability of vested pension rights and tax difficulties linked to acquiring pension
rights in more than one Member State.
Results of the consultation on the Green Paper
55. In the field of social security, regulation 1408171 has permitted the co-ordination of the
schemes of employed, self-employed people as well as their families. The diversity 
national schemes could only lead to co-ordination and not harmonisation. An approach
based on co-ordination and not harmonisation would , also be appropriate for
supplementary schemes.
56. The responses to the Green Paper demonstrated that there is a large consensus on the
Commission s approach to the elimination of obstacles to free movement related to
supplementary pensions. This elimination should be progressive and, therefore
Directive 98/49/ECadopted on 29 June 1998 should form the basis of further action. This
Directive represents a first step towards removing obstacles to the free movement of
workers. Under the Directive, posted workers now have the possibility to continue to
make contributions to the pension scheme in the Member State of origin.
57. A majority of Member States think that further new legislative action is at this stage
premature. Nevertheless, a majority of other actors (social partners, pension funds)
recognise that the problems identified in the Commission s Communication of 1991 .and
in its Green Paper on Supplementary Pensions are real, and that they impede free
movement of persons within the European Union. The European Parliament and thc
Economic and Social Committee also consider that the problems encountered by workers
moving within the European Union are significant, and that the Community should take
further action to eliminate these obstacles since they are incompatible with the concept of
the Single Market.
58. There is also a view that before taking any further action, the Commission should have a
closer look at how questions such as transferability of pension rights, long vesting
periods and problems related to double taxation, should be tackled.
59. Cross-border membership, at least for some categories of migrant workers moving for a
short period to another member State, could be useful in order to avoid changes from one
scheme to another and losses of pension rights. However, cross-border membership of
workers will be very difficult to realise in practice. Apart from the harmonisation of
prudential rules presented in the previous chapter, it will require mutual recognition of
See Case C-279/93,  Finrlnzaml Kijln-Aflstadt  v.  Schumacher judgment of 14 February 1995, ECR 
225; Case C- 19/92,  Kraus,  judgment of 31 March 1993, ECR p.I- 1663; Case C.8Q/94,  Wielod.x,
judgment of 11 August 1995, ECR p. 1-2493; Case C- 1O7/94,  Asscher judgment of 27 June i996,
ECR pI-3089. the relevant fiscal provisions in Member States and a series of amendments to existing
national regulations governing 'labour conditions. However, cross- border membership
would strongly facilitate labour mobility in the Union and is asked for by representatives
of the industry. It should thus be seen as a medium to long-term objective for the
European Union.
60. The idea of a Pensions Forum, as suggested by the High Level Panel on Free Movement
was generally welcomed by the social partners but not by government representatives
who preferred that the Commission use the existing bodies organised at Community level
such as the Advisory Committee for Social Security of Migrant Workers. This is also the
proposal of the Economic and Social Committee. The European Parliament welcomes
however, the idea of such a Forum.
Possible actions
61. The responses to the Green Paper would suggest that there are a number of areas in
which future action might be taken.
Qualifying conditions for acquiring supplementary pension rights
62. It is evident from the reactions to the Green Paper that this is an issue where there is no
consensus amongst Member States. At this stage, a legislative framework seems to be
premature. However, it cannot be denied that qualifying conditions in broad terms can
constitute an obstacle to labour mobility.
63. The creation of a skilled and adaptable European workforce for the next century is 
central elernent of the European Employment Strategy and, as such, is a key policy
objective for the Union. Long vesting periods for supplementary pension schemes tend to
hamper the ability of workers to move in response to labour market developments:
something which is likely to be of greater importance than ever in the future world of
work.
64. In addition, it could be argued that long vesting periods are a source of indirect
discrimination affecting female workers, since they are most likely to change jobs or
interrupt their careers. This aspect has been emphasised on several occasions by the.
social partners and the European Parliament.
65. The Commission would feel that it would be appropriate to open a debate at European
level with the social partners il1 order to examine how this obstacle to free movement can
be overcome.
66. The Commission will also take particular care to ensure that discriminations based on sex
are eliminated in the area of supplementary pensions.
.. Cross-border affiliation for workers, other than posted, moving from one
Member State to another for a short period
67. Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 allows workers who .are posted by their employer to
another Member State, to remain affiliated to the supplementary pension scheme in the
Member State where they were previously working. All other workers moving for 
limited period to another Member State do not have this option. Like posted workers,
these people expect to return to their Member State of origin and would normally wish to
do so without a break in the accrual of their pension rights. Consequently, they wouldbenefit from being able to continue to make contributions to the supplementary pel1sions
scheme in the Member Sate of origin.
68. All the comments received by the Commission indicate that cross-border affiliation , as
described above, would be an important step in terms of removing obstacles to free
movement of labour across Member States' boundaries, but that it would be difficult to
put into practice. It requires the lifting of a number of obstacles to the continued
affiliation of the worker to hislher former pension scheme. An agreement between the old
employer in the Member State of origin, the new employer in the host Member State, the
worker, and where applicable, the supplementary pension scheme in question is not
always easy to achieve.
69. The Commission will launch a study to examine in detail how the difficulties for cross-
border affiliation of this category of workers could be overcome. In the light of the
results of this study, the Commission will take the appropriate action in order to tackle
this problem. '
Transferability of pension rights
70. The need for action in this area was, in particular, ernphasised by trade unions and
representatives from pension funds. It is undeniable that the calculation of transfer values
which penalise scheme leavers and inadequate preservation of "dormant" rights are
severe obstacles to labour mobility.
71. Th~ wide variation in the method of financing supplementary pensions in the actuarial
calculation of transfer values and in taxation treatment, makes transferability from one
Member State to another difficult. Technically it is possible in all countries to accept
transfers from another Member State but this ability is theoretical or impossible in
practice for certain schemes such as the book-reserve and pay-as-you-go schemes both of
which do not set aside financial assets to back up their pensions commitments.
Transferability would be possible only in the case of funded schemes where the nature of
the scheme permits it.
72. In a general way, withil1 one Member State there are common actuarial standards to
calculate the values of capital transfers from one scheme to another, provided that the
schemes are of a similar nature. However, in the absence of a standard approach to the
treatment of capital transfers in the supplementary schemes between Member States, a
worker moving to another Member State is disadvantaged more than if transferring
capital values to another company within his or her home country.
73. A lowest .commondenominator for the calculation of the amount of capital transfers and
the conversion of such transfers into future pension provision could help to overcome
part of the problem.
74. In cases where capital transfers are not possible, preservation of vested rights would be
the only option. In these cases, a guarantee should be created that the "beneficiaries" of
so-called dormant rights will get a fair share out of their supplementary pension scheme.
It is clear that all of these goals will take some considerable time to achieve.
75. The Commission will intensify .its efforts with the assistance of all parties involved
(representatives from governments, social partners and supplementary pension funds) to
resolve the technical problems relating to the transferability of pension rights such as thetransfer of rights only to approved supplementary pension schemes, or the establishment
of actuarial standards of transfer values.
7(). This would serve asa basis for further explorati.on of the necessity for a legal framework
on transferability of vested rights.
77. The commissi.on will also contil1ue its research in the area .of supplementary pensions
with the publication of a biennial report 011 the situation in the different Member States.
This will be prepared in collaboration with a network of high-level national experts on
supplementary pensions.
Pensions Forum
78. The establishment of a Pensions Forum has been suggested by the High Level Panel on
Free Movement. Such a Forum would serve as a vehicle to bring together representatives
of all inv.olved parties (governments, social partners and pension funds) to consider how
barriers t.o cross-border labour mobility related t.o supplementary pensions can be
addressed. The Forum could assist the Commission to find appropriate solutions for the
remaining pr~blems identified, as well as in relati.on to the follow-up of existing
Community legislation. . 
79. The Commissiol1 supp.orts this idea and has, accordingly, decided to convene a Pensions
Forum which will meet twice a year, to be composed of representatives of government,
social partners, pension funds and, if appropriate, other institutions active in this field.
TOW ARBS A BETTER COORDINATION OF NATIONAL TAX
SYSTEMS
80. The Green Paper dealt with both 2nd pillar and 3rd pillar arrangements, and the
basic tax problems are indeed identical. For practical reasons, however, the first
step of staged Community action could tackle the tax treatment of cross-border
contributions by migrant workers to supplementary pension institutions within the
2nd pillar alone.
Results of the Green Paper consultations
81. The diversity, complexity and specificity of national tax rules that have developed over
the years have been identified as major barriers to the free movement of persons and the
freedom to provide services in the field .of supplementary pensions and life assurance.
Basically, the problems are the general question of how to treat cross-border payments to
supplementary pension funds or life assurance companies and the fact that migrant
workers are confronted with two or m.ore pension and taxati.on systems which are not
necessarily compatible.Box  11:
Summary oftlte problems resultingfrom heterogeneous tax regimes
In many Member States the tax treatment of supplementary pension contracts and life
assurance policies which have been concluded with non-resident institutions is less
favourable than the treatment of policies with resident institutions. Generally, there is no
principle of mutual recognition, so it is unlikely that a pension scheme approved in one
Member State will meet the requirements for tax relief which is granted to schemes in
another Member State. Consequently, persons interested in supplementing their pensions can,
in practice, only buy national products if they wish to benefit from tax relief. Pension and life
assurance institutions from other Member States are thus forced to set up an establishment in
each Member State in order to secure the same tax conditions for their product. This negates
freedom of services and freedom of choice for the consumer.
A worker migrating from one Member State to another is often prevented from continuing
with a policy held in his Member State of origin because the host Member State does not
allow the deduction of premiums paid, or else taxes the contributions paid by the employer in
circumstances in which contributions to an institution in the host Member State would not be
taxed.
The most serious problems have been identified with persons migrating from a Member State
which operates the so-called EET system (contributions are ~xempt, growth of the policy is
~xempt, benefits are taxed) to a Member State with the so-called TEE system (contributions
are taxed, growth of the policy is ~xempt, benefits are ~xempt) or vice versa. This basic
mismatch of systems can lead to situations of double non-taxation (contributions can be
deducted and proceeds are not taxed) or double taxation (both contributions and proceeds are
subject to taxation).
During the consultations, many expressed the view that the EET system is the most
appropriate approach and should, in the long run, be generally applied. Its main advantage is
that no tax is levied on an unsure future benefit when a pension is not inherited and the
beneficiary may die before retirement (in which case, under a TEE system, he would have
paid taxes via his contributions on pension payments he never received).
Pension and life assurance institutions can also face tax obstacles, notably when investing
across borders. Some of these obstacles are linked to the fact that pension institutions are
often not subject to tax. An example mentioned in the reaction to the Green Paper was the
capital gains tax imposed by a Member State on non-resident institutions which invest in
assets located or traded in that Member State, compared with resident pension institutions
which are exempt. This biases decisions on asset allocation within the single market. As to
the accumulation of pension fund benefits, tax rebates are sometimes only given in respect of
investment within the Member State concemed.
Clearly, the above problems are exacerbated when more than two counties are involved. This
is the case, for instance, where a migrant person is working in one Member State for a
multinational company based in another and contributing to a supplementary pension fund in
a third Member State. Therefore, some contributors stressed the need to find European
solutions, in particular a definition of a pension plan that would be recognised for tax
purpos.es in all Member States. In their view, this could then lead to the establishment of tax-
efficient, genuine pan-European pension funds that can operate throughout Europe and thus
benefit from the resulting economies of scale.82. The consultations also touched on the question of how these problems could be
overcome. Some contributors expressed the view that the Commission should draw up
guideline standards, based on principles and practices that are common to a number of
existing bilateral agreements. In the discussions it was. stressed that non-binding
measures might be easier to achieve, but that their practical use might also be limited. An
advantage of bilateral tax treaties is that they can be tailored to the pension systems of the
countries concerned. On the other hand, it would be extremely cumbersome and
time-consuming for Member States to negotiate and renegotiate 105 agreements
34 and
this would still not guarantee equal treatment and non-discrimination. The immediate
practical value of guideline standards could therefore be limited, as it would take decades
to integrate them into the bilateral tax treaties.
83. Others contributors were of the opinion that Community legislatiotl would be the most
reasonable solution. The mutual recognition of pension schemes, criteria for the genemI
recognition of genuine old-age schemes for tax purposes, rules allocating the right to tax
in a way which prevents double taxation, but also rules to ensure an appropriate level of
taxation, an effective system for the exchange of information, and efficient rules on
mutual assistance in collection were mentioned as possible features of a Community
initiative. Mention was made of a multilateral convention or a directive as examples of
legally binding measures, providing legal certainty and creating a level playing field.
Possible actions
84. This is particularly important for workers moving from one Member State to an another
who risk losing benefit rights already acquired under the scheme in the Member State
where a pension has already been taken out. At present. there is no Community
legislation governing the allocation of the right to tax pension income, or the tax
treatment of transfer values representing pension rights acquired under a previous
pension scheme. Nevertheless Member States should ensure that workers exercising their
right to free movernent should not be subject to any form of undue restriction or
discrimination, in accordance with Articles 39 and 43 and Regulation 1612/68.35
85. Whilst there should be safeguards to ensure that tax cannot be avoided by a migrant
worker or a pensioner, Member States should ensure that migrant persons are not subject
to any forrn of double taxation. Most bilateral taxation treaties currently include such
provisions, often drafted along .the lines of Article 18 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention on Income and on Capital, which attributes the right to tax to the country of
residence. If no bilateral treaty exists, the way in which double taxation is avoided
depends on the national legislation of the relevant Member States.
86. In a statement in the ECOFIN Council minutes of 1 December 1997, the Commission
undertook to consider the problems of the taxation of life assurance and pensions with
the assistance of the Taxation Policy Group and with a view to possibly drawing up a
proposal for a directive. The ultimate objective of this work is to ensure in practice the
free movement of workers and self-employed persons (Articles 39 and 43of the EC
Treaty) and the freedom to provide services (Article 49 of the EC Treaty), as provided
for in the 3rd life .assurance Directive  94/96/EC.  This work has already begun.
34 Wiiliin the Union, there are 105 possible bilateral relations, of which 98 are currently covered by II
bilateral or multilateral tax treaty. Only a few of them already contain comprehensive arrangements in
this area. In a Union with 20 Member States iliere will be as many as 190 bilateral relations.
35 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers
within the Community, OJ L 257, 19.10.1968, p. 2.iii Principles for a coordinated approach
87. In the Commission s opinion, the Green Paper on supplementary pensions, the written
reactions and the hearing which followed show that there is a general consensus on the
need for coordinated action on the basis of a step-by~step approach. After reviewing the
results of the consultations, the Comrnission draws the conclusion that such a
coordinated approach should build on the following principles:
The purpose is not, to seek harmonisation of Member States' pension. and life
assurance taxation systems. A coordinated approach would be adapted to the diversity
of rules within Member States. This approach has been successfully followed in the
social security field, narnely in Regulation  1408171.
The freedom to provide serVices al1d the free movement of persons cannot be
hampered by unduly restrictive or discrirninatory tax treatment of cross-border
pensions and life assurance.
Any common approach should allow and help Member States to safeguard the tax
revenues which they are entitled to collect according to their tax legislation. It should
provide for a system which is enforceable and which stimulates compliance with tax
legislation by convincing taxpayers that they cannot escape their obligations
wherever they go or invest within the Union.
The influence of the case-law of the European Court  of  Justice
88. According to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, restrictions resulting from
unjustified differences in the tax treatment of cross-border pension and life assurance are
contrary to the EC Treaty, in particular Articles 39, 43, 49,et 56. In the  Sajir  case,36 the
Court held that rules entailing differences in the tax treatment of. foreign insurance
policies which were likely to dissuade individuals from concll,lding insurance policies
with insurers established in other Member States were in principle contrary to Article 49
of the Treaty. The Court robustly rejected all the arguments put forward to justify the
restriction, in particular that of fiscal coherence. It should be noted that on no occasion
since the  Bachmann  case 37 has the Court entertained this specific justification for tax
policies.
State of play in the Taxation Policy Group
89. At the meeting of the Taxation Policy Group on 3 July 1998, members were invited to
express their views on the main issues relating to a coordinated approach for the taxation
of supplementary pensions and life assurance. There was unanimous agreement on the
need to do further work on the issue, with most members agreeing to a coordinated
approach. The above-mentioned principles - no harmonisation, no discrimination, no
revenue shortfall - were very broadly endorsed. There seemed to be support for tackling
36 Case C-118/96 (1998) ECR 1-1897.
37 Case C-204/90 (1992lECR 1-249. The Court held that Belgium s refusal to allow deduction of pension
and life assurance premiums constituted discrimination contrary to Article 39 and 49 However, it also
held that, according to the characteristics of the Belgian pension tax system, such discrimination was
justified by the need to preserve fiscal coherence. It is worth recalling that the Belgian tax system
consisted in a delayed tax payment and not in an exemption given to pensions taken out in Belgium. In
those circumstances, the refusal to grant an exemption for the premiums of non-Belgian insurance was
balanced by the fact that no taxation would have been imposed on the proceeds of such an insurance
policy, in contrast to a policy subscribed in Belgium. The Court s reasoning relating to fiscal coherence
was set out more precisely in Case C-80/94  Widockx  (19951 ECR 2493.as a matter of urgency the problems of migrant workers and there was also some support
for exploring ways of improving the exchange of information. Some members favoured
legally binding measures - a multilateral convention was a frequently mentioned option 
but .others clearly opposed any legally binding solution, and could only support
guidelines. Some members also stressed the need to take account of social and legal
problems, instead of simply focusing on tax aspects.
90. At the meeting of the Taxation Policy Group on 8 March 1998 there was agreement that
a staged step-by-step approach would be advisable for addressing the differing and
complex problems. Mernbers also agreed that the first step should ideally tackle the tax
treatment of migrant workers' cross-border contributions to second pillar institutions.
Bookreserves schemes would nevertheless not be covered, since there are no
contributions paid by the employees but only a commitment of the employee
Future work to be envisaged
91. The Cornmission believes that the Taxation Policy Group is the most suitable forum for
consultation with Member States on how to take the issue further. Given thecornplexity
of the topic, it has been decided to create a technical I'ub-group which will assist the
Taxation Policy Group.
92. The Commission hopes that, on the basis ,of the work il1 the Taxation Policy Group and
the technical group, it will be possible to formulate an appropriate legislative initiative in
1999 or 2000. It follows from the foregoing that such initiative would be only the first
step in the direction of broader action in this field. This first step could usefully cover the
tax treatment of cross-border contributions by migrant workers to supplernentary pension
institutions.ANNEX 1
Measures to be 'considered following the consultation on tbeGreen Paper on
supplementary pensions in the single market
Measure
Proposal for a
directive ojdhe
prudential
regulation of
pension funds
Consultatio~s on
theeonditions for
acquiring
supplementary
ension ri hts
Feasibllity~tudy
on cross-bdriter
' ,
membership'
Technicii ,
. .
transferabilltyof
supplementary
pension rights
Obj~en~~
To protect members
rights, ensure
freedom of
investment and
management, and
facilitate
cross-border
membershi .
To facilitate labour
mobility and ensure
freedom to provide
;f,
": supplementary
pension and life
assurance services.
To identify means
of facilitating labour
mobility.
To examine in detail
the obstacles to
cross-border
membership, and
identify ways of
eliminatin them.
To create a forum
for specific dialogue
on pensions and
labour mobilit .
To examine the
conditions for
introducing a
legislative proposal.
lristitUijQtl~lbndi~~: :;Po~gllile tiii~frame
eollceffled ,
Commission, Adoption by the
interested parties, Cornmission at end
then Council of 1999/early 2000.
Parliament and Negotiatiol1s with
Economic and Council and
Social Committee. Parliament from
2000.
Member States
Commission (in
context of Taxation
Policy Group).
Council, Parliament
and Economic and
Social Committee
(if proposal for a
directive is
resented).
Commission and
employer/employee
organisations.
Commission
Commission
Commission in
conjunction with
Member States, the
pension fund
industry and
employer/employee
or anisations. '
35 '
Consultations to be
continued in 1999.
Possibility that a
proposal for a
directive will be
presented by the end
of 1999 or early
2000.
During 1999/2000.
During 1999/2000
During 1999 or
2000
During 1999/2000.
Possibility that a
proposal for a
directi ve will be
presented during
2000.ANNEX 2
Returns 011 pension fund portfolios 1984-96
(mean of real total return in local currency)
Percent domestic 1984-93 1984-96
currency
Belgiurn
Denmark
Gennanv
Ireland 10. 11.0
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United KinJ!:dom 10. 10.
United States
No asset limits
Asset limits
Sources: EFRP report, June 1996; Pragma Consulting; and OECD staff calculationsANNEX 3
\"rdkativc comparison betweeKl life assurance compa!!li~s, opeEli pensioKi ftmds ::md
dosed pension funds
I Nawnre
Relationship to
other financial
0 erators
Situation ~;~e,
; ,
event ot'anr 
. ,
occupational
scheme being
interru
Guarantee of
payment of
supplementary
occupational
benefits
Relationship to
members of
occupational
ension ~~lrJ;~P1e.$;.
Service provider
Policyholders are
generally one of 
several groups of
creditors.38 Each
group has its claim
met in a specific
order.
Provided by the
insurer except in the
case of policies
linked to an
investment fund
where it is
stipulated that the
insurer does not
assume any'
investment risk
Indirect, via the
employer.
Open:p~nsion
funds
Commercial activity
generall y based on a
single product
Both service
provider and
consumer
Members are
generally deemed to
own the assets held
by the fund
Generally provided
by the pension fund
in the case of
defined benefit
schemes;
investment risk
borne by the
employee in defined
contribution
schemes.
Indirect, via the
employer,
Generall y
non-commercial
activity based on a
sin Ie service
Both service
provider and
consumer
Members are
generally deemed to
own the assets held
by the fund.
Generally provided
by the employer in
the case of defined
benefit schemes;
investment risk
borne by the
employee in defined
contribution
schem~s.
Members frequently
participate in the
management of the
scheme
38 See 
the proposal for a Commission directive on the winding-up of direct insurance undertakings
(89/C253/04 OJ C 253, 6.10. 1989).ANNEX 4
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This annex shows that for periods longer than 10 years, a portfolio consisting of 100%
stocks was equally volatile (in other words, equally safe) as one consisting f 100%
bonds but that shares had returns of approximately 7% and bonds of only 3- ~%. Over a
working life, a difference of 3% every year is enormous. Minimum risk sho ~s lowest
possible volatility that could have been obtained with the best mix of bonds and stocks.ANNEX 5
United States: Annual total return by category of asset (1926-1995)
US Treasury bills
Intermediate-term government bonds
Long-term government bonds
LlJng-term eorporate bonds
Small eompany stoeks
Large company stoeks
Source: Morgan Stanley Dean WitterANNEX 6
Equity versus Bond Markets
Excess Return Equities
Local Currencies
Annualised figures 15 year period 10 year penod
1984-1998 1989-1998
Belgium 09% 1.98 %
France 12% 17 %
Germany 4.36 % 71 %
Italy 95% 3.47 %
Netherlands 18 % 95%
Sweden 4.32 % 94%
Switzerland 88% 12.08 %
67% 1.40 %
USA 29% 08%
Spurce: Pragma Cpnsulting  NV/SAGloss~lrv of terrns relatine: to pension funds mana!!ement
Actuarial calculation : calculation rnade by an actuary to establish whether a pension
scheme has enough assets to cover its liabilitieslcommitrnents. The actuary must ensure
that the liabilities .are calculated in an adequate manner.
Asset allocation : the spread of assets of a fund by type of asset and/or geographical area
Asset Liability Manae:ement : method which aims to mini mise risks by managing and
contro-Iling the matching of liabilities, assets, liquidity and investment polity
Assct Manae:cr : person engaged by the pension fund to manage the assets of the fund. It
can be a credit institution, an insurance company or a collective investment company
(DCITS). Some funds manage their own assets.
Currency matchine: : requirernent that assets used to cover liabilities are denominated in
the same currency as these liabilities
Custodian : institution (usually a credit institution) which holds the assets and the of the
pension fund
Defined Benefits Scheme : scheme where the benefits are fixed in advance (e.g. as a
percentage of salary). In general the employer bears the risk with respect to the payment
of the pension.
Defined Contribution Scheme : pension scheme in which the contributions are
fixed.The payment depends on the level of these contributions and on performance of the
assets purchased. The employee usually bears the investment risk. 
Fund Manae:er : persons responsible for the overall policy of the fund (its financial
particularly asset allocation, and administrative aspects). Managers are in general
representatives of the affiliates and the employer. The management can also be delegated -
to trustees, who make the commitment to manage the fund to the bast of their capacities.
Fundine: reQuirement : requirement that the assets of a fund that are used to cover
liabilities must never be less than these liabilities.
Sponsorinl!: company : company or group of companies which use the services of a fund
in order to provide a pension to employees
Technical provisions : item on liability side of balance sheet of a pension fund which
represents the commitments undertaken by the fund. These technical provisions must be
covered by assets whose liquidity, security (diversification) and rate of return are adapted
to the commitments made.